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India left aside the economic philosophy of import-substitution led growth model in 1991, 
and increasingly integrated itself with the world economy. While the GDP growth of the 
country has been commendable in global comparison, devolution of actual development at 
state level is a relevant research question. It has been argued that India’s poorer growth 
prospect in recent times is a result of the counterproductive policies adopted over last decade, 
particularly since 2009. The present analysis contributes to this debate by exploring two key 
questions. First, it enquires how the government policies on social sector, measured by 
inflation adjusted average per capita social sector expenditure (PCSSE) and per capita grants-
in-aid disbursement (PCGAD), contribute to economic development, as reflected through 
inflation and inequality adjusted Monthly Per Capita Consumption Expenditure (MPCE), 
across various states over the last two decades. Second, it also attempts to explain the 
influence of the development dynamics, as reflected through growth in MPCE, on General 
Election outcomes. The analysis clearly indicates that the government policies in the social 
sector crucially influence the development process, which in turn may significantly affect the 
General Election outcomes. Given these findings, it is concluded that there is room for 
introspecting on recent restructuring on Centre-State financial devolutions. 
 
Keywords: public policy, consumption expenditure, political economy, development policy, 
NSSO Rounds, Indian states, social sector expenditures, budgetary devolution, federal 
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India left aside the economic philosophy of import-substitution led growth model in 1991, 
and increasingly integrated itself with the world economy. While the liberalization drive 
increased the external orientation with rising cross-border trade and investment flows, the 
insulation from the waves of global recession also eroded in the process. The basket of policy 
reforms, including removal of industrial licensing system, reduction of tariff barriers to allow 
import of cheaper raw materials and parts and components, improvements in ease of doing 
business, allowing 100 percent foreign direct investment in almost all sectors etc., 
significantly propelled the growth engine. Over the last two decades, India has consistently 
been posited as a major driver of world growth, given the high level of annual GDP growth 
that the economy witnessed. The Goldman-Sachs report by Wilson and Purushothaman 
(2003) specifically noted the expectation on rising incomes, demand for capital and high 
growth in Brazil-Russia-India-China (BRICs) that is likely to unfold over the next few 
decades. The subsequent World Bank and International Monetary Fund projections have also 
put Indian economic growth well above the world average (Sugden, 2016).  
 
The Indian growth path since 1991 in the light of the global scenario can be viewed from 
Figure 1, where the average GDP growth (annual percent) for select economy groups, China 
and India has been compared by using World Development Indicator data (World Bank, 
undated). Instead of individual countries, the growth pattern of China and India has been 
compared with various low and middle income country groups from across the regions, so as 
to review their performance in a wider context. It is overserved that China and India are 
performing commendably in terms of growth scale. The growth scenario in East Asia & 
Pacific (developing only) is higher vis-à-vis India because of inclusion of China in that group. 
Over 2001-10, China and India have grown at an annual average growth rate of 10.52 percent 
and 7.54 percent respectively, as against the corresponding figure of 2.59 percent for the 
world economy. However, during 2011-14 the annual average growth rates for China, India 
and the world declined to 8.05, 6.48 and 2.49 percent in that order. It is evident that while the 
growth prospects in China and India suffered due to the series of events from 2009 onwards 
(e.g., the sub-prime crisis, the Greek debt crisis, the Eurozone crisis, and the recent global 
recession), they remained considerably above the corresponding global average.   
 
It has been argued that India’s poorer growth prospects in recent times is a result of the 
counterproductive policies adopted over last decade, particularly since 2009 and economic 
growth has resulted mostly from continuation on past developmental activities (Panagariya, 
2016). Given this debate, one major question that emerges is whether the government policies 
have contributed to the development process across various states over the last two decades. 
Second, evidence from literature suggests that political competition can influence human 
development (HD) in the country (Dash and Mukherjee, 2015). The current study attempts to 
understand whether the development process can influence General Election outcomes.  
 
Keeping this perspective in mind, the current paper intends to understand the level of 
economic development across the 28 Indian states and the political repercussions in the post-
liberalization period. The paper is organized as follows. First, a brief discussion on 
development process in India and the government initiatives for promoting the same is 
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undertaken, followed by description of the methodology adopted. Based on the findings, the 
policy observations are noted at the end. 
  
The current study contributes to the political economy of development literature in the 
following manner. Per capita gross state domestic product (GSDP) as an indicator for 
measuring level of development has certain obvious shortcomings in the Indian context. The 
factors like industrial agglomeration, population density, spread of the service sector etc. are 
uneven across states, and therefore the average figures will not represent the actual scenario. 
Instead of the GSDP figures, the monthly per capita consumption expenditure (MPCE) of the 
states is a more suitable indicator (GoI, 2002). The present analysis estimates the inflation 
and inequality adjusted average MPCE expenditures in all 28 states and links the same with 
the government expenditure in terms of state-wise Per Capita Social Sector Expenditure 
(PCSSE) and Per Capita Central Grants-in-aid (PCGAD), both of which crucially facilitate 
economic development process. The state-wise observations are then used for understanding 
whether they can explain the General Election outcomes during 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014.    
 
India after Liberalization: A Review of Issues   
 
India in the post-independence period depended on a planned growth approach in line of 
Harrod-Domar framework, which underlined the need for boosting the savings rate and 
marginal product of capital for securing growth (Eckaus, 1967). Apart from heavy 
industrialization, it also relied significantly on employment creation through generation of a 
vibrant small scale industries network through policy push like reservation, priority sector 
credit etc. (Morris and Basant, 2006). It further attempted to reduce the disadvantages in 
securing industrial growth in states away from mineral-rich regions through freight 
equalization policy (1948). In short, the approach favoured equity over regional growth. 
However, the limitations associated with the import-substitution led growth policy intensified 
in eighties, finally reaching peak in early nineties due to a number of external and internal 
factors (Bajpai, 2002; Joshi and Little, 1996). The liberalization policies initiated in 1991 set 
the stage for realization of scale economies by removing the entry and licensing restrictions, 
size and concentration related limitations and so on. The freight equalization policy was 
removed, thereby enabling the states to encourage the industries to relocate to their territories 
and plan their growth path. The attractiveness of the states, especially economic freedom 
index in the urban centres, has undergone interesting transitions since then (Debroy et al., 
2011; Debroy et al., 2013; Debroy et al., 2014).  
 
Overlooking the distributional consequences in the aftermath of economic reforms may 
lead to increase in poverty and other livelihood challenges (Coudouel et al., 2006). India’s 
journey from early nineties to the present has been far from a smooth one. The rural economy 
faced various challenges since nineties, the first and foremost of which has been the falling 
agricultural productivity. Studies reveal that the compound annual growth rate of all crops in 
1990s has been lower vis-à-vis the corresponding 1980s figure (Sharma, 2011). Even states 
like Punjab were not immune to this trend (Sidhu, 2002). Declining trend in rural 
employment was also noticed (Chadha and Sahu, 2002). The fall in foodgrains production led 
to a fall in real agricultural wage growth from 4.68 per cent to 2.04 per cent between 1981-91 
and 1991-99 (Saxena, 2000). However growth in the non-farm sector during nineties was 
subsequently witnessed (Eswaran et al., 2009). Recent studies reveal that while states are 
converging in terms of land productivity, the same in terms of labour productivity is still 
forthcoming (Balaji and Pal, 2014). It can be noted that labour productivity happens to be a 
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function of various factors like nourishment and calorie intake, HD achievements etc., which 
crucially depend on government policies to promote development.  
 
The growth scenario in the urban sector has been rosier, though associated with its own 
challenges, e.g., managing water supply, sewerage and solid waste, urban transport, securing 
institutional arrangements for growing urbanization etc. (Vaidya, 2009). Service sector 
contributed significantly in the urban growth process (Pais, 2014). The decline in poverty 
trends since mid-nineties, as noted by various NSSO rounds, indicated the trickle-down effect 
of growth (GoI, 2013).i 
 
Despite economic growth, unemployment and rise in inequality has emerged as two major 
concerns. First, rise in unemployment rate during nineties was noticed, though labour 
productivity and average wage earning also increased (Sundaram, 2001). In recent period, 
duration of unemployment has been longer, with increase in casualisation and marginalisation 
of both the rural and urban workforce. In addition, the male‐female and rural-urban rates of 
unemployment have narrowed over the period, owing to both from demand and supply side 
related dynamics (Mohan, 2014). Moreover growing inequality in multiple dimensions, e.g., 
between agriculture-non agriculture disparity in per worker income, wage earners and owners 
of capital, between locations etc., has been noticed (Papola, 2012). All these have influenced 
the change in average MPCE across Indian states differently. Recent observations show that 
inequality within food and non-food groups has come down, although overall expenditure 
inequality is widening (Basole and Basu, 2015).  
 
Figure 2 reveals that in terms of household final consumption expenditure growth, China, 
India and other developing countries of East Asia have performed commendably during 
2011-14. All these economies witnessed a growth rate in excess of 8 percent during this 
period, which is markedly higher as compared to the corresponding figure during the 
preceding period (2001-10). The result underlines certain improvements in Indian households 
vis-à-vis other regions of the world. This underlines the need to focus on the major drivers of 
such development. 
 
Human development is a crucial driver of economic development, both in India and 
abroad (Mukherjee and Chakraborty, 2011; Mukherjee et al., 2016). Recognition of the 
importance of social sector schemes for promoting HD and creating an enabling environment 
at state level, either directly or indirectly, is vital. The current discussion focuses on two 
specific routes through which such supports can be provided.  
 
First, per capita social sector expenditure (both revenue and capital expenditure) captures 
the per capita public expenditure of the respective State Governments. However, it is not 
entirely financed by the States by their own resources (own tax and non-tax revenue). 
Expenditure on social services comprises (in major heads) of education, sports, art & culture, 
medical & public health, water supply, sanitation, housing & urban development, information 
& broadcasting, welfare of scheduled caste, scheduled tribes & backward classes, labour & 
employment, social welfare & nutrition and other social services. Expenses on social services 
not only provide public goods and services but also help in construction (capital expenditure) 
and maintenance (revenue expenditure) of basic social infrastructure. These expenditures are 
building blocks of long run investment in human capital formation (education, health and 
employment). Achieving equity and equality in provision of public goods and services across 
States is the basic objective of the fiscal policy. Different States have different capacities to 
mobilize their own resources, given their locational disadvantages and endowment of natural 
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resources. Therefore achieving the objective of equity would have remained an elusive dream 
if there was no system of fiscal devolution. In federal system, fiscal devolution plays a crucial 
role as equaliser in achieving vertical (centre – state) as well as horizontal (across states) 
equities.  
 
Second, apart from the share in central taxes, States also receive Central grants-in-aid to 
support basic functions of the government. Grants-in-Aid from Centre comprises of plan and 
non-plan grants. Non-plan grants are mediated by the Finance Commission awards and plan 
grants are mediated by the erstwhile Planning Commission through plan transfers determined 
by the modified Gadgil-Mukherjee formula. Plan grants comprise of ‘Grants for State / Union 
Territory Plan Schemes’, ‘Grants for Central Plan Schemes’, ‘Grants for Centrally Sponsored 
Plan Scheme’ and ‘Grants for Special Plan Scheme’ (mostly for North Eastern States under 
the Schemes of North Eastern Council). The dependence on grants-in-aid across States varies 
depending on their own fiscal space. For example, during 2001-14, on an average grants-in-
aid financed 10.5 percent of total expenditure of general category states (GCS) (minimum 2.4 
percent to maximum 22.8 percent), the corresponding average figure stood at 52.4 percent 
(minimum 25.4 percent to maximum 89.5 percent) for special category states (SCS).  
 
Both as part of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) commitments and the 
unilateral efforts for augmenting education and health related achievements, a number of 
policy measures have been introduced in recent times. Several policies that are being 
implemented across states through government support, which in long run would enhance 
HD, income and welfare, deserves mention in this context. For instance, the Sarva Shiksha 
Abhiyan (SSA) has been initiated for ensuring universal elementary education among 
children aged 6-14 across the states and the National Programme of Mid-Day Meals in 
Schools have been an integral part of it. While the scheme has improved the enrolment rate, 
the quality of food served remains a major challenge (Khera, 2006). The Indian Parliament 
has enacted The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act in 2009, which is 
another crucial step for facilitating inclusive growth (Tilak, 2007).  
 
Apart from provision of education, the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM, 2005-12) 
has been launched with the objective of reducing Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) and Maternal 
Mortality Ratio (MMR), ensuring universal access to public health services such as women’s 
health, child health, water, sanitation & hygiene, immunization, and nutrition, preventing and 
controlling communicable and non-communicable diseases, including locally endemic 
diseases etc. However, the achievements initially had been moderate owing to multiple 
factors, including failure of decentralisation, lack of inter-sectoral coordination and the 
undermining of traditional health support etc. (Ashtekar, 2008). The National Urban Health 
Mission (NUHM) has been launched to help the urban poor, particularly the slum dwellers by 
enabling them to access essential primary health care services. Recent reviews indicate that 
the health network in the country has been significantly expanded with improvements in 
target indicators (GoI, 2015). In addition, the Pradhan Mantri Swasthya Suraksha Yojana has 
been introduced for improving the regional imbalances in provision of health services, 
especially keeping the vulnerable states in mind.  
 
The provision of the aforesaid initiatives in education and health spheres, along with other 
measures, provided an indirect boost to income and consumption of target households. 
Among the direct measures, two initiatives deserve particular mention. First, The National 
Food Security Act (2013) made key foodgrains available at subsidized rates across the 
country, protecting the interests of below poverty line (BPL) households (Saini and Gulati, 
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2015). Second, The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) (2005) assured 
100 days’ work for poor households in rural areas where the labour hours can be utilized for 
creating public utilities. The initiative resulted in creation of new and substantive additions to 
the resource base and infrastructure (Ranaware et al., 2015). On the flip side though, the 
MGNREGA work is driven by the supply of work, not the demand for it and the role of 
lower-level functionaries, as a result of which the success depends on a lot of factors not 
initially considered by the policymakers (Chopra et al., undated).  
 
Data and Methodology 
 
The current analysis uses state-specific poverty lines for correcting for inflation and all 
prices are in 1993-94 prices. The reason for considering poverty line instead of other 
alternatives (e.g., Whole Sale Price Index, GDP deflator) is that since the consumption 
expenditure is adjusted by using poverty line (as per the methodology of National Human 
Development Report 2001), it has been used to keep parity. Though poverty lines are 
available for rural and urban areas separately, we have estimated rural – urban combined 
poverty line by using population shares. For state-wise population, we depend on NSSO 
reports (quinquennial rounds on consumption expenditure) where estimated population are 
given separately for rural and urban areas. End point population is used to get the per capita 
figures. For example, to get per capita social expenditure for the period 1993-99, we have 
divided average social sector expenditure during 1993-94 to 1998-99 by 1999-2000 
population (rural and urban combined). Per capita expenditures in current prices are 
converted into 1993-94 prices by using poverty line of the beginning period of the block 
period. For example, for the period 1999-2004, the per capita expenditure during 1999-2000 
to 2003-04 is adjusted by using poverty line of 1999-2000. If poverty line of 1993-94 is 
expressed as P93, and poverty line of 1999-2000 is P99, then per capita expenditure during 
1999-2004 (say, PCE99) in 1993-94 prices turns out to be PCE99*(P93/P99).             
 
Both social sector expenditure (included revenue and capital expenditures) and grants-in-
aid figures are taken from Finance Accounts of the respective State-governments. As 
compared to other database (e.g., RBI State Finances Database), Finance Account data is 
audited statement of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India.         
 
The inflation adjusted average PCSSE and PCGAD figures for the 28 states are reported 
for four time spans. First, 1993-99 signifies a period when initially the Congress coalition 
government was in power, followed by the short-lived United Front governments and the first 
National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government. The period was characterized by domestic 
challenges following economic reforms and political instability. Second, 1999-2004 denotes a 
period of relative stability during the NDA tenure, when a number of initiatives for 
infrastructure development (both in rural and urban areas) and trade promotion were 
introduced. Third, 2004-09 indicates the period when the first United Progressive Alliance 
(UPA) government came to power, and a number of social sector policies targeting 
upliftment of the underprivileged were initiated. Finally, 2009-12 represents the first three 
years of the second UPA government, whose policies were increasingly questioned from 
2010 onwards and several accusations of rent-seeking activities surfaced.   
 
For understanding the dynamics in the post-liberalization period, average MPCE data is 
obtained from the following National Sample Survey Organisation’s (NSSO) quinquennial 
surveys: (50th Round: 1993-94, 55th Round: 1999-2000, 61st Round: 2004-05, 66th Round: 
2009-10 and 68th Round: 2011-12). While 1993-94 represents the post-reform period, 1999-
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2000 on the other hand, depicts the period of turmoil owing to several external (e.g. Southeast 
Asian Crisis) and internal factors (e.g., political uncertainty etc.). In comparison, 2004-05 is a 
phase characterized by economic stability as well as introduction of several HD and quality 
of life augmenting policies. Although the policies continued in the subsequent period, since 
2008 GDP growth rate declined considerably owing to global recession. 2009-10 and 2011-
12 therefore capture the development scenario in post-recession phase and immediately after 
the fiscal stimulus package was announced by the Government of India. 
 
The average MPCE data, as obtained from NSSO is first adjusted for inequality using 
State-wise Gini Ratios of MPCE (also provided in the quinquennial rounds). The inequality 
adjustment is important because a State characterized by high average MPCE with lower Gini 
Ratio is better off as compared to a State with higher average MPCE with higher Gini Ratio, 
and that perspective need to be factored in. The inequality adjusted MPCE is further adjusted 
for inflation, by considering State-specific poverty line, to make it amenable to inter-temporal 
and inter-spatial comparisons (GoI, 2002). The poverty lines corresponding to NSSO rounds 
are available from Planning Commission publications.  
 
The aforesaid adjustments are carried out along the following lines. If ijGR  is the Gini 
Ratio for the jth State for the ith period and ijMPCE  is the average monthly per capita 
consumption expenditure for the jth State for the ith period, inequality adjusted average 
monthly per capita expenditure for the jth state for the ith period ( ijIMPCE ) is expressed as 
ijij MPCEGR Χ− )1( , where 10 ≤≤ ijGR . After adjustment for inequality for each of the 
states, the adjustment for inflation is carried out. If ijPL  is the poverty line (in Rs. per capita 
per month) for the jth State for the ith period and jPL1983  is the poverty line of the jth State for 
1993-94, then inflation and inequality adjusted average monthly consumption expenditure for 
the jth State for the ith period ( ijIIMPCE ) is expressed as ijijj IMPCEPLPL Χ− )( 941993 .ii The 
calculation of inflation and inequality adjusted MPCE of a state is carried out in this 
manner.iii Once the inflation and inequality adjusted MPCE figures for the states are 




The inflation adjusted PCSSE figures for the 28 states are summarized in Table 1, and the 
following conclusions emerge. First, during 1993-99 to 1999-2004, PCSSE (in 1993-94 
prices) of 8 general category states (GCS) (out of 15 GCS, as Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh 
were not formed in that period) registered growth rate lower than 10 percent. Even Kerala, 
Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh registered negative growth rates. In the same period, out of 10 
special category states (SCS), 8 states registered growth rate lower than 10 percent and 
Manipur and Nagaland registered negative growth rates. Maximum and minimum growth in 
PCCSE was reported in Goa and UP respectively. Average growth rate of PCSSE in GCS 
was only 8.7 percent, whereas the same for SCS was only 1.5 percent.  
 
Second, during 1999-2004 to 2004-09, only 3 out of 17 GCS had lower than 10 percent 
growth rate in PCSSE (namely, Goa, Gujarat and Punjab). For SCS, 6 out of 11 states had 
less than 10 percent growth rate and Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland experienced 
negative growth rates. All three new states (Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Uttarakhand) 
reported quite high growth rates. Among SCS, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland reported 
negative growth rates. Though three SCS (J&K, Manipur and Tripura) registered positive 
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growth rates, the figures remained below 10 percent. Lowest growth rate was reported in 
Nagaland. In comparison to previous period, the performance of GCS improved but the 
improvement in performance of SCS remained moderate. Average of GCS improved by 27.3 
percent, whereas average of SCS improved by only 14.1 percent. 
 
Finally, during 2004-09 to 2009-12, except two States (Jharkhand and Punjab) all GCS 
registered positive and higher than 10 percent growth rate. Except Manipur and Nagaland, all 
SCS registered double digit growth rates. The average of GCS improved by 24.9 percent, 
whereas the corresponding figure for the SCS stood at 28.6 percent.    
 
The inflation adjusted PCGAD figures, reported in Table 2, leads to the following 
observations. First, during 1993-99 to 1999-2004, 9 out of 15 GCS registered lower than 10 
percent growth rate in PCGAD disbursement. Out of these 9 States, all of them registered 
negative growth rates, barring the exception of Madhya Pradesh. For SCS, except three States 
all States registered higher than 10 percent growth rate, with Assam registering a negative 
growth rate. Average PCGAD for GCS declined by 1.8 percent, while the same for SCS 
increased by 4.5 percent.  
 
Second, during 1999-2004 to 2004-09, except two states under GCS all states registered 
double digit growth rates. Goa registered a negative growth rate. Average of GCS increased 
by more than 80 percent. Though, average of SCS increased by 19.2 percent, 6 out of 11 
states experienced a growth rate lower than 10 percent. Interestingly, 5 states witnessed 
negative growth rate.  
 
Finally, during 2004-09 to 2009-12, 9 out of 17 GCS registered lower than 10 percent 
growth rates. 5 States (Gujarat, Kerala, Punjab, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu) witnessed 
negative growth rates. On the other hand, 7 out of 11 SCS had growth rates lower than 10 
percent, among whom Manipur, Tripura and Uttarakhand registered negative growth rates. 
Average of GCS and SGS increased by only 15.8 percent and 12.2 percent respectively. 
 
The obtained results on inflation and inequality adjusted average MPCE are summarized 
in Table 3, from which the following conclusions emerge. First, over 1993-94 to 1999-00, 
MPCE has increased for all Indian states, which partly indicates the trickle-down effect of 
growth in the post-reform period. Only 7 states experienced growth less than 10 percent and 
no state has experienced negative growth in MPCE. Second, over 1999-00 to 2004-05, MPCE 
has declined for all the 28 states, signifying a general decline in monthly per capita 
consumption expenditure pattern across the country. Third, over 2004-05 to 2009-10, MPCE 
registered a fall only in a SCS, Nagaland. Finally, over 2009-10 to 2011-12, MPCE declined 
for two north-eastern states, Arunachal Pradesh and Tripura and a relatively backward state, 
Uttar Pradesh. However, 15 states experienced less than 10 percent growth in MPCE during 
this period. 
 
The PCSSE and PCGAD expenditure patterns along with the MPCE trends clearly 
indicate the close association between social sector expenses as well as central grants and 
household consumption standards. During 1999-2004 increase in the inflation adjusted 
PCSSE and PCGAD remained moderate in most of the Indian states as compared to the 
corresponding 1993-99 figures and the reduction in government support can be partly 
responsible for decline in inflation and inequality adjusted MPCE across states. In other 
words, the reduction in social sector supports accordingly influenced the consumption level, 
even if poverty level declined during the period. Conversely, when the budgetary devolutions 
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on PCSSE and PCGAD increased over 2004-09 as compared to 1999-2004 figures and in 
2009-12 over the preceding period for most of the states, MPCE registered a rise. MPCE 
considered here as a suitable proxy of well-being, the observations underline the crucial role 
of government interventions to promote livelihood improvement across the States through 




Economic development has been a dynamic process in India. The current study examines 
whether the government expenditures have reflected in the average monthly per capita 
consumption expenditure of Indian states. Our findings indicate that government 
expenditures – both PCSSE and PCGAD - positively influence MPCE in the county. In 
developing countries like India, public investment in human capital formation (e.g., in health, 
education, employment generation) rather complements private investment.        
 
Existing literature indicate that increasing public spending on developmental activities 
exerts a positive and significant effect on HD achievements (Dash and Mukherjee, 2015; 
Mukherjee and Chakraborty, 2011; Mukherjee et al., 2016). Higher HD facilitates abilities of 
the households to engage in productive activities, and accordingly enhance their income and 
wealth. It may be argued that the intense political competition may encourage the incumbent 
governments at centre or states to undertake steps which are welfare-augmenting in nature. In 
this context, there is need to differentiate between populist policies and truly HD augmenting 
initiatives. Policies that facilitate HD by enhancing education, health and indirect income 
supports, enable families at the margin to emerge out from the shadows of uncertainty and 
contribute as productive entities in the growth process. The public expenditure on social 
sector fronts rightly qualifies for such supports.  
 
Given the development pattern, with change in governments, the financial transfer 
framework may however witness reorientation of priorities. As the analysis indicates, average 
MPCE increased during late nineties, and the consequent perception on well-being can be 
suggested as one of the underlying factors behind the short-lived NDA government coming 
back to power at the 1999 General Election. The budgetary devolution figures reveal that the 
returning NDA government focussed on other areas (e.g. infrastructure) instead of social 
sector schemes, which can be observed through decline in the inflation adjusted average 
PCSSE and PCGAD across several key states. The changed budgetary priorities are part 
responsible for the decline in adjusted average MPCE in almost all parts of the country, and 
the perceived economic stress by the households got reflected in the ballot box during the 
2004 General Election. The new UPA government realigned the focus towards social sector 
schemes and the rise in average PCSSE and PCGAD was subsequently reflected in higher 
cross-state adjusted average MPCE scenario in the following period. It may be argued that 
the sharp rise in budgetary devolution on these two fronts over 2004-09 to 2009-12, enabled 
the government to come back to office in the 2009 General Election. However, over 2009-10 
to 2011-12, the number of states with MPCE growth less than 10 percent reached 15 
(including populous states like Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka), i.e., the extent of 
development was thin in a major part of the country. This perceived lack of well-being may 
explain the return of NDA to power in 2014 General Election. The observations clearly 
underline that the government policies in the social sector crucially influence the 




In the aftermath of 14th Finance Commission award and restructuring of Centrally 
Sponsored Schemes (CSS), a larger responsibility has been bestowed on the States to chart 
out their own development path depending on structure and composition of the economy. In 
view of higher share in tax devolution to States (from 32 percent to 42 percent of divisible 
pool as per the award of 14th Finance Commission) and recommendations of the sub-group of 
Chief Ministers on rationalization of CSS (Niti Aayog, 2015), the Government of India has 
consolidated the numbers of schemes into three categories – a) Core of the Core Schemes (6 
schemes), b) Core Schemes (19 schemes) and c) Optional Schemes (3 schemes), and also 
changed their financing patterns. Only Core of the Core Schemes will be solely financed by 
the Central Government. For the Core Schemes the sharing pattern between States and Union 
would be in the ratio of 90:10 in case of North Eastern and Himalayan states, and 60:40 for 
all other states.iv For Optional Schemes, the sharing pattern would be 80:20 for North Eastern 
and Himalayan states and 50:50 for other states. The restructuring has however been 
criticised for not including schemes on health and education in the list of ‘Core of the Core 
Schemes’ (Chakraborty and Gupta, 2016).v Given the observations of the current analysis, 
there is need to introspect closely in this matter.           
 
Two areas of future research would reveal interesting insights. First, in the aftermath of 
the 14th Finance Commission recommendations, it has been expressed that the policy of 
restructuring CSS and giving importance to schemes which assist / supplement present 
consumption (e.g., NREGA) cannot give long run growth impetus that can be secured 
through human capital development route (e.g., education and health related achievements). 
A balanced approach is required, but this may not the objective for any government when the 
assurance of coming back to power is uncertain. Availability of the next NSSO round results 
will enable researchers to assess how the changed financial devolution patterns have been 
reflected in MPCE across states and in what manner they influence the change of government 
in the 2019 General Election. Second, applying the methodology discussed here, MPCE can 
be calculated for the rural and urban areas separately, which would provide richer 
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Table 1: Per Capita Social Sector Expenditure in Indian States over 1993-94 to 2011-12 
 
Sl. No. States Average Per Capita Social Sector Expenditure (Revenue + Capital) 
(Rs.) (1993-94 Prices) 
Percentage Change in Average Per Capita Social Sector 
Expenditure 







1 Andhra Pradesh 664 744 916 1,018 12.1 23.2 11.2 
2 Bihar 355 385 521 588 8.5 35.4 12.8 
3 Chhattisgarh -- 443 1,001 1,402 -- 126.0 40.0 
4 Goa 2,105 3,024 2,758 4,005 43.7 -8.8 45.2 
5 Gujarat 867 1,071 977 1,302 23.6 -8.8 33.3 
6 Haryana 826 841 1,066 1,438 1.8 26.7 35.0 
7 Jharkhand -- 343 873 857 -- 154.5 -1.8 
8 Karnataka 755 803 1,154 1,328 6.3 43.7 15.1 
9 Kerala 955 934 1,079 1,354 -2.1 15.5 25.5 
10 Madhya Pradesh 526 610 691 943 16.1 13.3 36.5 
11 Maharashtra 793 929 1,162 1,384 17.2 25.1 19.1 
12 Orissa 570 581 827 1,151 2.0 42.4 39.2 
13 Punjab 810 870 818 885 7.4 -6.0 8.3 
14 Rajasthan 808 800 909 1,015 -1.0 13.7 11.6 
15 Tamil Nadu 882 979 1,158 1,561 11.0 18.2 34.8 
16 Uttar Pradesh 398 375 609 775 -5.7 62.2 27.4 
17 West Bengal 538 655 778 1,111 21.8 18.7 42.9 
Weighted Average of General Category States* 624 679 864 1,080 8.7 27.3 24.9 
18 Arunachal Pradesh 2,636 2,762 3,158 4,202 4.8 14.4 33.1 
19 Assam 698 719 843 1,218 3.0 17.2 44.5 
20 Himachal Pradesh 1,690 1,911 2,243 2,640 13.1 17.4 17.7 
21 Jammu & Kashmir 1,451 1,857 1,904 2,255 28.0 2.5 18.5 
22 Manipur 1,803 1,713 1,772 1,859 -5.0 3.5 4.9 
23 Meghalaya 1,490 1,495 1,363 1,824 0.3 -8.9 33.9 
24 Mizoram 4,046 4,159 3,012 3,623 2.8 -27.6 20.3 
25 Nagaland 3,865 3,762 2,428 2,429 -2.7 -35.4 0.0 
26 Sikkim 3,479 3,676 4,184 6,186 5.7 13.8 47.8 
27 Tripura 1,452 1,621 1,702 2,099 11.6 5.0 23.3 
28 Uttarakhand -- 726 1,355 1,722 -- 86.5 27.1 
Weighted Average of Special Category States 1,224 1,243 1,419 1,825 1.5 14.1 28.6 
Number of States with negative growth in PCSSE - - - - 5 6 1 
Number of States with growth less than 10%     15 7 4 




Table 2: Capita Grants-in-Aid Disbursement by the Central Government in Indian States over 1993-94 to 2011-12 
 
Sl. No. States Average Per Capita Grants-in-Aid Disbursement by the Central 
Government (Rs.) (1993-94 Prices) 
Percentage Change in Average Per Capita Social Sector 
Expenditure 







1 Andhra Pradesh 201 240 294 314 19.5 22.6 6.8 
2 Bihar 134 114 297 319 -14.9 161.1 7.3 
3 Chhattisgarh -- 135 396 611 -- 192.9 54.6 
4 Goa 476 327 308 590 -31.4 -5.6 91.3 
5 Gujarat 158 248 249 235 56.6 0.7 -5.9 
6 Haryana 161 157 228 351 -2.3 45.0 54.2 
7 Jharkhand -- 97 295 475 -- 204.2 61.0 
8 Karnataka 156 204 377 409 30.9 84.8 8.6 
9 Kerala 213 168 308 274 -20.8 83.1 -11.2 
10 Madhya Pradesh 172 176 349 441 2.7 98.0 26.3 
11 Maharashtra 136 110 320 321 -19.4 191.0 0.4 
12 Orissa 254 253 486 625 -0.6 92.2 28.5 
13 Punjab 150 175 308 259 16.3 76.2 -16.0 
14 Rajasthan 291 245 306 302 -16.0 25.2 -1.4 
15 Tamil Nadu 164 181 334 319 10.2 84.7 -4.7 
16 Uttar Pradesh 149 103 210 292 -31.3 104.9 38.8 
17 West Bengal 152 186 290 361 22.6 55.8 24.3 
Weighted Average General Category States* 169 166 299 347 -1.8 80.1 15.8 
18 Arunachal Pradesh 6,075 6,331 6,805 9,932 4.2 7.5 46.0 
19 Assam 672 544 813 834 -19.0 49.4 2.6 
20 Himachal Pradesh 1,479 2,001 2,769 2,925 35.3 38.4 5.6 
21 Jammu & Kashmir 2,985 4,151 3,993 4,491 39.1 -3.8 12.5 
22 Manipur 2,621 2,946 3,859 3,776 12.4 31.0 -2.2 
23 Meghalaya 1,957 2,221 2,079 2,733 13.5 -6.4 31.5 
24 Mizoram 6,857 7,028 6,062 6,188 2.5 -13.8 2.1 
25 Nagaland 6,261 9,306 6,350 6,785 48.6 -31.8 6.8 
26 Sikkim 5,077 6,141 5,655 7,970 20.9 -7.9 40.9 
27 Tripura 1,928 2,412 3,365 3,353 25.1 39.5 -0.4 
28 Uttarakhand -- 724 1,251 1,212 -- 72.8 -3.1 
Weighted Average Special Category States* 1,680 1,755 2,091 2,345 4.5 19.2 12.2 
Number of states with negative growth in 
PCSSE - - - - 9 6 8 
Number of States with growth less than 10%     12 8 16 








States Inflation and Inequality Adjusted Monthly Per Capita 
Consumption Expenditure (MPCE) 
Percentage Change in Inflation and Inequality Adjusted 
Monthly Per Capita Consumption Expenditure (MPCE) 









1 Andhra Pradesh 230.9 246.0 197.8 275.6 337.3 6.5 -19.6 39.4 22.4 
2 Bihar 179.0 202.1 166.0 204.8 249.4 12.9 -17.8 23.3 21.7 
3 Chhattisgarh* 203.7 216.5 173.6 234.8 259.8 6.3 -19.8 35.2 10.6 
4 Goa 360.4 453.7 295.3 423.4 480.9 25.9 -34.9 43.4 13.6 
5 Gujarat 261.9 309.3 235.9 302.7 340.7 18.1 -23.7 28.3 12.6 
6 Haryana 288.0 363.6 269.4 343.5 408.5 26.3 -25.9 27.5 18.9 
7 Jharkhand* 179.0 202.1 189.8 238.9 250.5 12.9 -6.1 25.8 4.9 
8 Karnataka 223.6 267.3 219.7 302.5 330.3 19.6 -17.8 37.7 9.2 
9 Kerala 289.1 366.1 319.1 405.1 449.7 26.6 -12.8 26.9 11.0 
10 Madhya Pradesh 203.7 216.5 192.2 255.5 275.8 6.3 -11.2 32.9 7.9 
11 Maharashtra 247.9 288.2 245.4 350.3 407.0 16.3 -14.8 42.7 16.2 
12 Orissa 180.9 186.8 154.4 235.3 246.9 3.3 -17.3 52.4 5.0 
13 Punjab 333.4 380.9 280.6 340.8 393.4 14.2 -26.3 21.5 15.4 
14 Rajasthan 253.0 288.4 223.2 293.0 328.2 14.0 -22.6 31.3 12.0 
15 Tamil Nadu 232.9 281.3 254.2 362.1 401.3 20.8 -9.6 42.4 10.9 
16 Uttar Pradesh 210.3 235.8 200.9 239.0 229.6 12.1 -14.8 18.9 -3.9 
17 West Bengal 233.8 249.9 227.2 280.8 313.2 6.9 -9.1 23.6 11.6 
18 Arunachal Pradesh 237.9 294.5 237.2 324.8 299.6 23.8 -19.5 37.0 -7.8 
19 Assam 224.4 229.4 215.9 265.4 271.0 2.2 -5.9 22.9 2.1 
20 Himachal Pradesh 268.4 349.7 266.4 374.4 393.6 30.3 -23.8 40.5 5.1 
21 Jammu & Kashmir 303.6 370.8 288.4 346.0 371.9 22.1 -22.2 20.0 7.5 
22 Manipur 259.2 292.0 205.4 221.8 237.0 12.7 -29.7 8.0 6.9 
23 Meghalaya 280.0 333.3 254.8 303.6 319.0 19.1 -23.6 19.1 5.1 
24 Mizoram 365.9 422.5 246.6 305.4 314.6 15.5 -41.6 23.8 3.0 
25 Nagaland 383.7 536.7 282.2 273.3 297.5 39.9 -47.4 -3.2 8.9 
26 Sikkim 249.1 278.0 223.1 316.9 321.6 11.6 -19.7 42.0 1.5 
27 Tripura 274.8 286.8 205.0 335.7 310.2 4.4 -28.5 63.7 -7.6 
28 Uttarakhand* 210.3 235.8 223.4 302.9 381.7 12.1 -5.2 35.6 26.0 
Number of states with negative growth in 
MPCE - - - - - 0 28 1 3 
Number of States with growth less than 10%      7 28 2 15 
Note: *-prior to 2004-05, consumption expenditure is considered same as the mother state   Source: Constructed by authors from GoI (2002, 2009, 2012, 2013) data   
16 
 




Source: Constructed by authors from World Bank (undated data) 
 
 
Figure 2: Comparison of Average Household final consumption expenditure, etc. 














































































































































































































































































































































































                                                            
i
  It deserves mention that the methodology adopted in the 1999-00 round was subject to criticism (Sen, 2000; 
Deaton and Dreze, 2002). 
ii
  State-specific poverty lines for the two periods (1993-94 and 1999-00) have been taken from GoI (2002) and 
for 2004-05, 2009-10 and 2011-12 data released by the Planning Commission (GoI, 2009, 2012, 2013) has 
been considered. 
iii
  Three new states, namely - Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Uttarakhand were created from Madhya Pradesh, 
Bihar and Uttar Pradesh in 2001. For periods before 2001, it has been assumed that the values of the 
variables are same for both the new and the existing states. 
iv
  In case a scheme/sub-scheme has a central funding pattern of less than 60:40, the existing funding pattern will continue. 
v
  Core of the Core Schemes comprise of: 1) Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, 
2) National Social Assistance Programme, 3) Umbrella Programme for Development of Scheduled Castes, 
Umbrella Scheme for Development of 4) Scheduled Tribes, 5) Backward Classes and other vulnerable 
groups and 6) Minorities. Core Schems comprise of 1) Green Revolution, 2) White Revolution, 3) Blue  
Revolution, 4) Pradhan Mantri Krishi Sinchai Yojna, 5) Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojna, 6) National 
Rural Drinking Water Programme, 7) Swachh Bharat Abhiyan, 8) National Health Mission, 9) Rashtriya 
Swastha Suraksha Yojna, 10) National Education Mission (NEM), 11) National Programme of Mid-day 
Meals in Schools, 12) Integrated Child Development Scheme, 13) Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojna, 14) National 
Livelihood Mission, 15) Forestry and Wildlife, 16) Urban Rejuvenation Mission, 17) Modernisation of 
Police Forces,18) Infrastructure Facilities for Judiciary, and 19) Member of Parliament Local Area 
Development Scheme (GoI, 2016). 
